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This is not exactly intended as a feminist tract, but I cannot deny that its
theme was prompted to some extent by current debates as to the essence
and the role of the female in society and in theology. I am concerned
here, however, rather with the role of the female in the cosmos. The point
has been made, with some justification in my view, that, in the case of
Christianity, the circumstance that the holy Spirit, the Hagion Pneuma,
which is functionally and, in I lebrew, grammatically, a female principle,
ruab, happens to become in Greek a neuter noun (and in Latin a masculi-
ne), results in an impoverishment and a distortion in orthodox Christianity
in respect of the feminine, a lack for which even the elevation of Mary to
the status of a Mother Goddess does not really compensate. In this respect,
as we shall see, the Gnostic sects are more imaginative and accommoda-
ting.
But I do not really want to involve myself in making controversial judge-
ments on Christianity. fly concern is primarily with the Platonist tradition,
and secondarily with certain sectors of the «underworld» of Platonism,
such as the Gnostic sects and the Chaldaean Oracles. Within that tradition
I want to discuss the various roles which have been found for a female
principle to play.
Before I begin I would like to make what seems to me a significant distinc-
tion between functional femininity & merely grammatical femininity.' Since
Phis originated as a lecture to the Department of (:lassies of the tniversity of Barcelona, to
whose hospitality and friendly criticism I am much indebted.
I. for some remarks on the origins of the feminine endings in Greek, see P. (:I I:\\ IR.Nt., Mor-
phologie historique du Grec, 2nd. ed., parts 1964, pp. 29-33, La formation des noms en grec ancien, Pa-
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nouns in the various languages we are involved with, Greek, I lebrew and
Latin, can find themselves in the feminine gender from purely technical
causes, a significant term in a philosophical system may find itself in the
feminine for no very substantial reason. For instance, it is not clear to me
that there is any compelling reason why the word for <<soul)) in Greek
(psyche), Latin (anima), and Hebrew (nephesh), should be feminine, while the
word for mind (nous, animus, !ev) should be masculine. But the fact that this
is so does, I think, at least help to create the basic antithesis between rea-
son, or intellect, and the unreasoning life-principle, or even sense-percep-
tion (which, of course, is also a feminine, aisthesis). To anticipate for a
moment our historical account, Philo is following the logic of Greek gram-
mar, as well as being thoroughly Platonic, when, in Book I of the Allegories
of the Laws, he allegorises Adam as nous and Eve as aisthesis.'
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But let us begin at the beginning, both chronologically and cosmologically.
There is a case to be made for regarding Platonism proper as beginning
only with the death of Plato, but I do not propose to he as strict as that.'
There are three entities in particular which I wish to dwell on in Plato's
own philosophy . These are the Indefinite Dyad, the World Soul of the Ti-
maeus, the Statesman, and Laws X, and the Receptacle ( ilmoSoxi ), or Nurse of
Becoming in the Timaeus -all feminine entities both grammatical and
functional.
The Indefinite Dyad (aopt6Toc Buac), of course , occurs nowhere as such in
Plato's written works , except perhaps in the form of the Unlimited of the
ris 1933. ( )n the origins and significance of gender distinctions in language in general, see the
excellent discussion of Gotz WlllNOI D, Genus and Semantik, Meisenheim am Glan 1967.
Ffforts on the part of comparative philologists to characterise the features of grammatical
gender have been frequent, and entertaining. I give, as an example, that of Jakob GRIMM, in
his Deutsche Grammatik (New ed. Gutersloh 1890), Vol. III, p. 357 (quoted by WuNt>LD, op.
cit., p. 20):
spas maskulinum scheint das fruhere, grossere, festere, sprodere, raschere, das thatige,
hewegliche, zeugende; das femininum, das spatere, kleinere, weichere, stillere, das leidende,
cmpfangende; das neutrum das erzeugte, gewirkte, stoffartige, generelle, unentwickelte,
collective.)>
This plainly aspires to scientific objectivity, and to some exent attains it, but even as a
statement of Grimm's personal views it is valuable, as the content of a well-schooled
I ndo- European -speak i ng mind. Those who have speculated on this question are broadly in
agreement that the assigning of grammatical gender to objects not distinguished by natural
gender is largely due to the personifying tendency of the primitive mind, which assigns sexual
roles and characteristics to inanimxtc objects and even to abstractions, aided in this activity by
its power of analogy. Certainly such >primitives mental activities have left their mark on
Greek philosophical speculation.
2. Leg. All. 11 19-25.
3. I cannot at the moment think of anyone who is, but it could he argued that Platonism, as a
system, originates only with Xenocrates.
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Philebus (16C) - which also has a feminine form, anripia - but it is generally
accepted, on the testimony of Aristotle, to have been a basic principle of
his metaphysics, at least in his later period., At Metaphysics I 6 (987b20ff),
Aristotle refers to Plato's basic principle opposed to the One as a dyad of
the ((great and small>>, performing the role of matter (('Xii). This is presen-
ted by Aristotle, rather tendentiously, as if it were a kind of pair, instead of
an undifferentiated indefiniteness, but what Plato probably had in mind is
more or less what is derivable from Philebus 24A-26D, where Unlimited-
ness is presented as something which can range indefinitely between oppo-
site poles, the most general of which are the opposites Great and Small.
(Aristotle uses the phrase &optcttoS fiua- later, in Books \I, 1081a14, and
N, 1088a15, to describe this principle, though it is not quite clear whether
this is Plato's own term for it).
At any rate, we have, as one of the two first principles of all things, a femi-
nine entity which serves as ((matter)>, or the womb of all becoming. As
such, it is tempting to bring it into some relationship with the receptive
principle of the 7'imaeus, described at 48D-53C, as, indeed, Aristotle does,
on various occasions, as we know. This entity, however, the <<Receptacle)>
(f aot oxlj) or ((Nurse (tttr)v>l) of all becoming>> (49A), seems to be some-
thing lower on the ontological scale, since it merely receives the copies of
the Forms, which have already taken shape in the paradigm (or, to demy-
thologise all this, in the divine Intellect), without serving as the material out
of which anything is made, whereas the Indefinite Dyad is the principle out
of which the Forms, regarded as Numbers, emerge in the first place. Ne-
t. I say `generally accepted', but of course there has been fierce controversy on this question, no-
table protagonists being Ilarold CIII.RvIsS, in Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, I,
and maim trenchant book reviews (against), and the Tubingen School of Konrad Gaiser (Pla-
tons Un eschriebene Lehre) and I I-) Kramer (in favour). But I think it is fair to say that a consen-
sus exists to the effect that Aristotle is not simply mistaken in his reports of Plato's doctrine
of the One and the Great-and-Small.
( )nc possible explanation of the extraordinary degree of misinterpretation present in such a
passage as Phhys. IV 209b1 1-16 (on which, see Harold C.nt[RVISS, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and
the Academy, pp. 112-24), where Aristotle first declares that in the Timaeus Plato says that
x opa is the same as i%it, and then that he uses a different terminology for this (presumably the
treat-and-Small) i:vv rot; ).cyotu`.voic xypaipoi 66ytiam , would be that the `xypaopa &iypara' were in
fact a document put together in the Academy only after Plato's death, perhaps not till the
time of \cnocrates, purporting to be what the Master had maintained in conversation, and
which would thus involve grave distortions, especially if, as I believe, the Master in fact
played his cards pretty close to his chest. If so, this would be paralleled later in what Clitoma-
chus and others slid to Carneades' `doctrines', and Aurelius to those of Plotinus. Such a docu-
ment would then in effect be the Gospel According to Xenocrates, which would help to
explain the distortions. Aristotle would know this, of course, but would feel free to take it at
its face value for polemical purposes.
5. It is important to specify that the Receptacle in the Timaeus is not a material principle in the
Aristotelian sense, though later Platonists generally took it as such. The combinations of
triangles which form the primary bodies arc not formed by the Demiurge from the Recepta-
cle, but rather projected onto it, as onto a kind of television screen. The Receptacle is simply
their x.wpa or etipa (Tim. 52A). Only Plotinus, however, among later Platonists, really seems to
appreciate the complexities of Plato's position (cfr. Enn. q 4).
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vertheless, the fact that at Tim. 5UD Plato is prepared to characterise it as a
«mothern, with the realm of Forms (or perhaps Intellect?) as the Father,
and the cosmos as the offspring, seems to give it a status akin in honour to
the Dyad, and this has productive results, I think, in such entities as Xeno-
crates' Dyad and Philo's Sophia.
So, from the perspective of later Platonism, we find in Plato a female, re-
ceptive, formative principle at both the top and the bottom, so to speak, of
the cosmic scale. Whether or not for Plato himself these two entities are in
some way the same is quite obscure, but in the metaphysical schema of his
immediate follower, Speusippus, they seem to have been, as we shall see
presently.
For the moment, however, I wish to turn to the other vitally important fe-
male principle in Plato's philosophy, the World Soul In Timaeus 34B-36D
the creation of this entity is presented in terms that are notoriously obscu-
re,`' but what at least is clear is Plato's intention to present it as an essen-
tially intermediate and mediating entity. The intricate blending of the three
elements of Substance, Sameness, and Otherness is designed to enable the
Soul to commune with both the realm of True Being and that of beco-
ming, the physical world. It must be noted that the World Soul, thus cons-
tituted, is a rational entity; even the Circle of the Other «partakes of reason
and harmony» (36E), as it contemplates every aspect of reality along with
the Circle of the Same. On the other hand, this rationality of the Soul's is
derivative, having been bestowed upon it by its maker, the Demiurge - or,
once again to demythologise the Tinraeus story, Intellect (Nous). The rela-
tions of Nous and World-Soul, and the degree of rationality accorded the
latter, will be a recurring theme in this account of Platonic doctrine.
"I'he position of the World Soul in relation to the Demiurge has further
light thrown on it in the ;Myth of the Statesman (2G9C-274D), though a
light that brings with it its own obscurities. Here the soul is much more
closely linked to the body of the cosmos, to the extent that in a number of
passages it is unclear what is being talked of, and some scholars, notably
P-1^I. Schuhl, have wished to take the motion of the cosmos independent of
the Demiurge as purely mechanical" F lowever, later Platonist saw here
G. I find Cc ^R,^I ^ ^Kn's interpretation (in which he follows Proclus) still the most com^incing (Pla-
to's Cosmology, pp. 59-6G), though it is a little disturbing that \enocrates, on the c^^idence of
Plutarch (De Proc. An. 1013E) does not seem to base grasped the subtleties of it.
?. I treat the Statesman after the Timaeur oiSaaxa^ix5 cvr.xx, though I regard it as in fact somewhat
earlier (I am not among those who accept `Owen's Theor}'' as to the early dating of the Ti-
maeur ). f lowever, the relation Ix•twecn Demiurge and World soul in the Statesman is fx•tter
discussed, 1 think, in the light of the more circumstantial exposition in the ^I^imaeur , and I do
not see that we need to postulate anp dceelopment or alteration of Plato's doctrine between
those two fairly contiguous dialogues -if they are correctly interpreted (along the linrs laid
down b^^ Harold CIIFRSISti, e. g. in «"I'he sources of l{^^il according ro Plato», Yra. Amer. Phi-
lot. .Soc. 98, 1954, pp. 23-30).
H. "There has been much discussion of this question. I refer the reader to the following: P-^1.
s(.I11'lll., `sus Ic m^^the du Politi9ue', Ker^ue de fl-letaf^byrique e! de Morale 39, 1932; Gregon•
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the workings of a World Soul, and it is the Statesman Myth in particular
that encourages Plutarch in his distinctive view of the World Soul as essen-
tially irrational, so we cannot neglect the passage.
The Stranger describes the universe (to rtxv) in 269c7 as <<a living thing
which has been allotted reason by its framer>> (5(7)ov ov )(ai (ppovtlctiv Ein>>xoc
r;x tou auvappoaavtoS), and this would, on Platonic principles, imply the
presence in it of soul, though a soul granted rationality by a principle ex-
ternal to it, as is the case in the Timaeus. The phrase used to describe its
innate motion just below (269d2), L avayxq Eptputov, can be taken to
refer to this essential irrationality, though it may just as well, I suppose,
refer to the purely mechanical tendency of the world body to revolve on its
axis when released from constraint. Again, in 270A, when released from
the control of the Demiurge, it <<proceeds of its own accord)> (6t' f;autou
ailtov it:vat), having built up a momentum which carries it on for many
myriads of revolutions, a turn of phrase really more compatible with purely
mechanical motion. hater, at 273B-D, we hear of the world being <<taught)>
by the Demiurge, then <<forgetting>> its teaching, and tending back towards
its original state of chaos, presented in very similar terms to that of the
<<original>> state of things in the Timaeus (30A) - all of which is at least
compatible with a description of the behaviour of inanimate matter. It is,
furthermore, a remarkable fact that the word WUX1 is nowhere used in the
whole course of the Myth (except to refer to individual souls, at 272e1-2).
Plainly, however, pace Schuh], there is a soul of some sort involved here.
At 269d8, the universe is said to <<partake in body>> (xexotv(6vgxt` ye xai
au>paroc) which implies that it is not just body, and at 2 70a3-4 it receives
life and a <<contrived immortality>> (aSavaaia > nlaxEUaatrj) from the De-
miurge, at least the former of which implies the presence of a soul of some
sort. Then there is the aitptputoS Fiti upia of 272e6, which, together with
the <<learning>> and <<forgetting)> of 273B-D, suggests an irrational soul ame-
nable to rational ordering, but having no innate reason of its own, which is
precisely what Plutarch sees here.
So Soul is pretty certainly present in the Statesman Myth, but how exactly
its activity is to be distinguished from the mechanical motions of the world
body remains a disputed question.
The other place in which the doctrine of a World Soul emerges -this time
explicitly- is in Laws X, and here the complication arises, or appears to
VI \" I( )"', " I'll c Disorderly Motion in the 'I'imaeus', CQ 33, 1939, pp. 71-83 (repr. in R. I`-
A I I I \, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London 1965); Hans HERFI:R, `Gott and die Welt bci
I'laton: Fine Studie zum Mythos des Politikos', BonnJbb, 158, 1958, pp. 106-117; id. 'Die
liewegung der Materic bet Platon', RhM. 100, 1957, pp. 327-47; T M. R( MIN,,,( )N, Plato} Psy-
eholoiy, Toronto 19711, ch. 8; J. B. Stir>IP, The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialggues, Cam-
bridge 1942 (2nd ed. Amsterdam 196'); id., Plato's Statesman, London 1952. Intro., pp.
82-112; and, most recently, R. D. Mt H tR, 'Disorderly Motion in Plato's .Statesman', Phoenix 35,
1981, pp. 199-215.
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arise, of two opposing Souls, a beneficent and a maleficent. In a well-
known passage, 896DI:, the Athenian Stranger reasons as follows:
((;lust we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that
Soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just
and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to
be the cause of all things?>>
Cleinias: «Of course we must>>.
Athenian: ((And as Soul thus controls and indwells in all things eve-
rywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm
that it controls the heavens also?))
Cleinias: ((Yes».
Athenian: ((One soul, is it, or several? I Will answer for you-<<Several».
Anyhow, let us assume not less than two -the beneficent
soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the op-
posite kind.>>
(trans . Bury).
I am prepared to agree with I larold Cherniss " and others that no dualism
of Good and FNil World-Souls is, despite appearances, intended by Plato
here, but it is more relevant to our theme that, rightly or wrongly, later
Platonists generally did assume that an Evil World-Soul is being described
in this passage, though subordinate to, rather than coordinate with, the
good Soul, which Plato presents as presiding over the heavens, and the, re-
gular motions of the heavenly bodies. The implication here is, though it is
not stated in this passage, that the irregularities of the sublunar world must
be laid as a charge against the evil Soul.
We have here, then, between the Philebus, the Statesman, the Timaeus and
Laws X, with some reinforcement from reports of Plato's oral teaching, a
comprehensive range of female cosmic principles, such as continues to be
of basic significance in later Platonism, in one guise or another: first, the
Indefinite Dyad; then, a rational World Soul; then (at least in the view of
later Platonists), an irrational (either neutral or maleficent) World Soul;
and lastly, formless and all-receptive Matter. I wish now to make some
attempt to trace the subsequent development of these entities over the five
hundred years or so that separate Plato and Plotinus. ()f necessity, this sur-
vey must be selective, but I will try to pick out the most important, and
most interesting, manifestations.
9. In 'The Sources of I?vil According to Plato's, cfr. above, n. 7.
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III
First of all, the Old Academy. Both Speusippus and Xenocrates retained
the basic pair of principles, One, or Monad, and Indefinite Dyad,'" and
each of them develops the doctrine in interesting ways. This is particularly
true of Speusippus, if we are prepared, as I am,'' to accept as essentially
Speusippan ch. 4 of Iamhlichus' De Communi Mathematica Scientia, which
certainly presents a cosmology highly compatible with what we can gather
from Aristotle's rather contemptuous and very allusive accounts of Speu-
sippus' doctrine. In this passage the two primary principles are presented
as the One and Multiplicity (n7 ^i oc). This latter is, admittedly, a neuter
noun, but it performs a characteristically female role, being the cause of di-
vision , and thus of the generation of all things , and is referred to directly
below as <(like an entirely fluid and pliable matter (f)yp^ rtyt navtana(T1 xai
cf)nt , iii In fact, what Speusippus seems to be doing is to connect
the primal Multiplicity (the Unlimited, or «Great-and Small))) with the Re-
ceptacle of the Timaeus, '- by postulating the same «female)) creative princi-
ple manifesting itself at a series of levels, altering its nature as a receptacle
according to the level of formative agent which acts upon it. This is, at any
rate, the best sense I can make of Speusippus' scheme (which Aristotle, as
we know, satirises as making the universe <<episodic)), Met. XII 10,1076a1).
The primal union is that between One and Multiplicity, and this produces
numbers. The first principle of number, then -whatever that is- acts
upon the matter corresponding to it, which is only the original ;Multiplicity
as modified by the action of the One. This union in turn produces geome-
tricals, both plane figures and solids. This third level of entity produces,
out of the first principle of geometricals and its corresponding Matter, the
Soul, which sets the geometrical level in motion, and hence acquires the
definition «the Idea of the omnidimensionally extended)) (Fr. 40 Lang).
The identities of the fourth and fifth level are not made clear in the DCMS
passage, but, if we are to extrapolate logically from what we have seen so
far, the fourth level would result from the action of Soul on its correspon-
ding Matter, to produce the level of physical life. The fifth and last level,
arising out of the action of immanent Soul upon what is now Matter in the
lu. Spcu,,ippus, Ir. 34 I.ang.= I r. 48 faran (the doctrine is here attributed to the ancients', but
that should not deceive us); Xenocrates , Fr. 15 I Ieinze.
1 1. Following the brilliant lead of Philip AIIRI.Av in From Platonism to Neo-Platonism , ch. 5. See
also the excellent article of I larold TARK \\ I, ' Speusippus ' ( ) ntological Classification ', Phronesis
XIX, 1974; pp. 130-145. The attempt of Leonardo 'h:ARAy in the introduction to his recent
edition of the fragments (Speusippus of Athens, Brill, Leiden 1981, pp. 86-107), to impugn the
identification I (1o not find decisive. I deal further with this in an articl'• in Phronesis XXIX,
1984, pp. 325-332.
1 la. An identification actually made by Aristotle at Phys. 209b35ff, and one for which he has been
strongly criticised, e.g. by (:IIIRNISs in The Riddle ofthe Early Academy, p. 17 ff
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((vulgar>> sense , would be that of the world of inanimate bodies. Since this
elaborate process cannot be conceived of as taking place in any sort of
chronological succession , how the various levels can be distinguished be-
comes for me, at least, a deep mystery, as it plainly was for Aristotle. The
argument given in DCMS IV (p. 16, 18ff) for this process, however, deser-
ves quotation , since it provides a rationale for the whole procedure:
((If one postulates one single Matter and Receptacle ,'' it would be
unreasonable not to expect that , since the Form of the One that im-
poses itself upon it is totally uniform , we should get a uniform class
of thing resulting. The consequence of that would be that all classes
of thing would be numbers, for we would not be able to postulate
any differentiating cause why at one stage numbers were generated,
and then lines , and planes , and solid figures , and not always the same
class, since they would be springing from the same principles uniting
in the same way.»
The argument , therefore , is that, since different classes of entity do in fact
arise in the cosmogonic process, and we cannot postulate a differentiation
within the One itself, nor yet within Multiplicity, (( pliable>> though it is, un-
less different stimuli are applied to it, one must come up with some such
scheme as this to account for the phenomena . Whatever about the validity
of this argument , the interest of Speusippus' scheme from our perspective
is that it provides a link between all the female principles we have so far
been considering , Dyad, Soul and Matter . We do not see any such linkage
again till Plotinus, with his doctrines of Intelligible Matter , and of Soul as
in a sense the ((matter)> of Intellect ( e. g. Enn. 11 4, 1-5; V 1, 3, 20-23).
Xenocrates presents no such complexities , but he does present us with a
problem --or at least his Fr. 15 does. Since this is a doxographic summary
of his doctrine by Aetius, the problem may not in fact go back to Xenocra-
tes himself. From Aetius we learn that Xenocrates
((held as gods the Monad and Dyad. The former, as the male princi-
ple, has the role of Father, ruling in the heavens . This he terms Zeus
and "Odd" (perittos), and Intellect, and it is for him the supreme God.
The Second is, as it were, the female principle , in the role of Mother of
the Gods ( if this is how jt tpoS t9r iv 6ixrly is to be taken ), ruling
over the realm beneath the heavens , who is for him the Soul of the
All.»
Now either Xenocrates really made his second principle a subcelestial enti-
ty, and identified it with the World Soul , or there is a lacuna in the text, or
there is no lacuna , but Aetius is misunderstanding Xenocrates . As to the
12. Note here the conjunction of c?.ti and i,naio;tij, indicating that Speusippus (if it is he) had no
qualms about presenting the Platonic Receptacle as Matter. I do not, however, see this as an
objection to Spcusippan authorship of this text, as does T.ARAN (op. cit., p. 107). The term ,?,q
does not have to he either the invention of Aristotle, or, even if it is, confined to him by
copyright.
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first possibility, it is difficult to see how Xenocrates could have combined
the Indefinite Dyad with a World Soul, especially as we learn from
the same Aetius (Fr. 2811) that he called his second principle othe everflo-
wing>> (arvaoc), by which, says Aetius, he means [Matter, by reason of its
multiplicity (it2Ji oc). This reference to it2 r oc may be an intentional remi-
niscence of Speusippus, and if so, it is possible that Xenocrates could have
telescoped all the levels of Speusippus' second principle, and identified it
with the World Soul. But that leaves him in the strange position of identi-
fying an essentially negative entity with one which is basically positive,
being the principle of order (presumably) in the cosmos, since it rules over
it -unless, of course, Xenocrates is taking a distinctly Gnostic view of the
ruling principles of this world.
In The Middle Platonists," I was inclined to suspect the second alternative, a
lacuna in the text of Stobaeus (where the doxographical notice is found),
and I am still inclined to that solution. A possible alternative, however, is
that Aetius is grossly confused. At any rate, the text cannot be correct. We
know, after all, from Plutarch (Prot. An. 1012D) that Xenocrates held that
the Soul (and we are talking about the World Soul of the Timaeus) is a pro-
duct of the action of the One on the Indefinite Dyad (his definition of the
Soul as (<number moving itself>> gains in meaning, I think, if one sees it as a
development of Speusippan doctrine). So the Soul cannot also be the Inde-
finite Dyad.
Faced with this problem, some scholars, notably I leinze " and, more recen-
tly, I l J. Kramer,'' have maintained that the Dyad mentioned in Fr. 15
cannot be the Indefinite Dyad, but must simply be the Soul seen as a dyad.
But this will hardly do. As reported by Plutarch (Prot. An. 1013E), Xeno-
crates identified the <<undivided essence>> of Tim. 35A with the One, and
othat which is divided about bodies)> with Multiplicity (70.1j8oc), <<which he
also calls the Indefinite Dyad>>, and the Soul is the product of these two.
Aetius is purporting to present here a summary of Xenocrates' metaphy-
sics, and if he leaves out the Indefinite Dyad, and calls the Soul a dyad
instead, then he is plainly in a state of deep confusion about his subject-
matter -a much more probable situation, in my view, than that Xenocra-
tes is involved in self-contradiction.
This does not quite dispose of the problem, though. Xenocrates chooses to
theologise his principles, making the Monad Zeus, and the Dyad uthe mo-
ther of the gods, by whom we must understand Rhea (already identified
with the Dyad by Philolaus (Fr. 20a), no doubt on the basis of a supposed
connexion with pt:u, -which would also concord with Xenocrates' epithet
for it, a vaoc). The fact that this puts Zeus in an Oedipal relationship with
I3. P. 25. 't'here is, incidentalh, an embarrassing misprint in my translatiim of I r. 15 there. For
`beyond the heavens' read 'beneath the heavens'.
14. Xenokrates, p. 35 n. 1.
15. Der Ursprunt der Geistretaphysik, pp. 39-41.
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his own mother does not seem to disturb him. What disturbs me, though,
about the text is the phrase «µrltp6S SFOJV iiix)Jv)). ((Aix>>v)) used adverbially
is a rather high-flown locution. It actually occurs no less than seven times
in the surviving portions of Aetius, but in all other cases it has its correct
meaning of ((in the manner of)), whereas here it would have to mean rather
(in the role of)), or <<representing>>, which would be something of a sole-
cism, though not, perhaps, impossible for a late Hellenistic writer. It is
here, at any rate, that I would conjecture a lacuna, adopting a proposal of
Pierre Boyance " that we understand Aixr1 with a capital letter, as a
personification. Boyance does not, however, take the obvious next step of
postulating a lacuna between 8i:6 v and Aixiw. But Xenocrates is not a fool.
Rhea cannot be Dike, since Dike is known, since I lesiod (W/orks and Da),s,
256) to be a daughter of Zeus, not his mother; and that is a very proper
theologising of the World Soul.
If either of my solutions of the problem of Fr. 15 is accepted, we find Xe-
nocrates making use of two female principles, the first, the Indefinite Dyad
as a material principle, the second, the World Soul. Neither of these enti-
ties can be considered an ((evil)) principle in any dualistic sense. I was
wrong, I think, in The Middle Platonists (p. 26), to describe Xenocrates'
Dyad, following Ilcinze,'- as an ((evil and disorderly principle)), because of
his alleged influence on the metaphysical schema of Plutarch's Isis and Osi-
ris, to which I shall turn presently. No entity which is theologised as Rhea,
it seems to me, can be regarded as positively evil, as opposed to incidenta-
lly introducing into the world effects that seem ((evil)) to us, as by-products
of multiplicity. Certainly, Xenocrates is attested as believing in evil dae-
mons (<pafXot 8aiµovFS Fr. 23-5ff), and the role of I lades as ruler of the
realm below the moon is a rather ambiguous one, but it does not follow
from that that we can refer back to him the strong dualism represented by
Osiris and Seth-Typhon. Plutarch's dualism is picked up elsewhere.
As for the World Soul, the theologising of it as Dike is very apt, I think, as
a portrayal of the Soul as presented in the 1 'imaeus. Dike, in I lesiod, on the
one hand sits by Zeus' side as his paredros, or assessor, and on the other
roams about in the physical world and reports back her impressions. This
seems to characterise very well the circles of the Same and the Other of
which the Soul is composed. Xenocrates' World Soul is thus a rational enti-
ty, though it possesses reason derivatively, as bestowed upon it by Nous; it
also presides over the realm of coming-to-be and passing away, of motion
in all its forms. That is what it is to be ((a number moving itself)).
16. `Xcnocratc ct Ics ( ) rphiques', Rh A 36, 1948, p . 218ff.
17. Xenokrates , pp. 3(1-5.
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IV
1'he legacy of the ( )ld Academy in the matter of female principles is thus a
broadly coherent one -Indefinite Dyad, World Soul, Matter, all three crea-
tive, receptive of rational influence, «evil», if at all, only incidentally or ne-
gatively. Only the possible maleficent Soul of Laws X stands out as
anomalous, and we cannot be sure what Plato really intended there. What
I would like to do in the latter part of this paper is to examine a few of the
female entities which occur in the later Platonist tradition, and see how
they fit into this Old Academic framework. I will take, in turn, Philo of
Alexandria's Sophia, Plutarch's Isis, the Hecate of the Chaldaean Oracles
and the Sophia of Valentinian Gnosticism.
Strictly speaking, Philo's monotheism should leave no place for an inde-
pendent female principle in the universe, but in fact, both the influence of
Platonism and the already established Wisdom tradition in Hellenistic Ju-
daism conspire to carve out a place in his system for such a principle. Such
a principle is often simply equated with the Logos, and as such is outside
the scope of this investigation, but in a number of passages we find the fi-
gure of Sophia, God's Wisdom, coming into her own.
In Sect. 109 of On Flight and Finding (Fug.), for example, we find the Logos
described as the son of God, and Sophia <<through whom the universe came
into existence>> (6t'fc is Ua ilX8sv riS y> vccytv). Sophia is here not simply a
material cause, since Philo uses the preposition dia, which is that proper to
the instrumental cause - normally, in fact, the Logos (cfr. Cher. 125ff). This
representation of Sophia as the instrumental rather than the material cause
concords well, in fact, with a piece of allegorising we know of from
Varro " (who was in philosophy a follower of the Platonism of Antiochus
of Ascalon). He is reported as identifying Athena (Minerva) with the cause
secundurrr quod, a rendering of kath'ho, which is a variant of di'ho. It looks
very much as if Philo is influenced by the contemporary Stoic and Plato-
nist allegorisation of Athene, springing, as she does, from the brow of
Zeus, with the Logos, in his treatment of Sophia here. She is not quite an
Indefinite Dyad here (Philo uses the term (<dyad>>, e. g. Spec. Leg. III 180;
Somm. 11 70, but always to describe Matter); she is more like a rational
World Soul, assisting a divine Nous in his creation -somewhat reminis-
cent, indeed, of Xenocrates' Dike.
At 116-117 of The Worse Attacks the Better (Det.), however, Sophia is given
the epithets -tpoq)o and t1 I1voxopoc (reminiscent of the rt8t)vf of Timaeus
49A), and described as <<mother of all things in the world (j.n rqp Twv Ev
xocsµeu ys:votu vq), affording to her offspring, as soon as they are born, the
nourishment which they require from her own breasts, a development of
18. Ap. Aug. CD VII 28.
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Plato's image which he would certainly not have approved of, as it gives
Matter far too benign and positive a role. Indeed, one is now inclined to
think rather of Xenocrates'. Rhea, as earth-mother. To complicate the issue
further, Philo just below (118) represents Sophia as the manna in the de-
sert, which he etymologises as "ai», the most general category of Stoic
logic, but, which he normally identifies with the Logos (cfr. LA III 175),
and which he here describes as i,oyoS 8>;ioc.
What this indicates is not, I think, complete incoherence in Philo's
thought, so much as a tension between the concepts of Sophia and the Lo-
gos, which potentially fulfil very much the same cosmogonic role. We can
see the same tension between the roles of Demiurge and World-Soul in
later Platonists such as Albinus or Numenius . What we have here is a crea-
tive and nurturing principle, plainly, in Philo's mind, subordinate to God,
but still presented as mother to all things ( including the Logos ), rather than
anyone's daughter, and so more a Rhea-figure than a Dike-figure. Sophia
certainly owes something to the tradition of Jewish Wisdom literature, but
in Philo's thought, in my view, Platonism predominates.''
Philo had the problem of fitting a female principle into a strongly mono-
theist framework. With Plutarch we find the contrasted situation, of a
female principle or principles being introduced into a thoroughly dualist
framework. I propose to confine my investigations to just one manifesta-
tion of femininity, the figure of Isis in the treatise On Isis and Osiris.
Plutarch does also recognise the Indefinite Dyad (Def. Or. 4281), as athe
element underlying all formlessness and disorder)), which he identifies not
only with the Necessity (Anagke) of the Timaeus (48A, 56C, 681:), but also
with what he sees as the Maleficent Soul of Laws X. However, when he
theologises this, as he does in the De Is. (369L), it is as male principle, the
Persian Ahriman or the Egyptian Seth-'Typhon. It also fills the role of
Matter, though it is a more actively evil principle than Matter is traditiona-
llv. taken to be. Isis, however, takes on some characteristics of Matter as
well, as we shall see.
Isis is presented at De Is. 372E as follows:
<Isis is, in fact , the female principle in nature, and that which receives
all procreation, and so she is called by Plato (Tim. 49A, 51A) the
<<nurse>> and (<all-receiving>> (7iav6rxi c), and by the majority of people
(<myriad-named>> since, through being turned this way and that by the
Logos (if that is the meaning of 6n6 tofu a,6-you -rpr-Tiop&Tj), she
receives into herself all the shapes and Forms (iSsac). She has an
innate love for the primal and most dominant element of all things,
which is identical with the Good, and this she yearns for and pursues;
but the portion which comes from evil she tries to avoid and reject,
19. For an interesting discussion of the Wisdom of.Solomon , see David WINStON, The Wisdon e/.Solo-
mon, trans ., with intro. and comm ., New York 1979 ( Anchor Bible Series), esp. pp . 20-63.
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for she acts as place and matter (X6)pa xai i',X) to both, but inclines
naturally always towards the better, and offers to it opportunity to
create from her and to sow into her effluxes and likenesses, in which
she rejoices and is glad that she is made pregnant and filled with these
creations. For creation is the image of Being in ;Matter, and the thing
created is the imitation of the existent.>>
What we have here is a female principle of the <<World Soul>> variety, but
an irrational World Soul, which Plutarch assimilates to the Receptacle of
the Tinnaeus. In fact we find very much such an entity in ch. 10 of Albinus'
Didaskalikos, a World-Soul essentially irrational, which requires <(arousing>>
by the supreme God, who is the cause of its intellect.'" It is not positively
an evil principle; simply ambivalent, and open to influence from either
side, though inclining towards the better.
Isis is, then, poised between a pair of antithetical principles. She is not
herself the antithesis of the Good. Yet she is presented by Plutarch a little
further on (3731:F), rather curiously, as the antithesis of a triad (Osiris -
Isis - I lorus) into which, he says, (<the better and more divine nature)) is
divided: othe Intelligible (voiitov), Matter (u1 ri), and the product of these,
which the Greeks call the world (xo(juoc))). Plutarch goes on to identify
these respectively with the Paradigm, the Receptacle and the <<offspring)>
(i`.xyovog) of the Tirrtaeus (50 CD). This triadic division must leave out of
account the primally evil principle (the Dyad, or Seth-Typhon), and also, I
suggest, the primally good one. What we have is a triad of Logos, irratio-
nal World-Soul (acting as its matter), and physical world.''
Isis is, then, a significantly different figure from Sophia, and more than a
step from her in the direction of Gnosticism.'' Indeed, there is one strange
phrase in Plutarch's account (373A), which I now think I made too much
of in The Middle Platonists (pp. 202-3), but which I still find puzzling. Plu-
tarch speaks of the loi,goi which descend to be uimpressedr> on the World
Soul being seized by «the disorderly and disturbing element which has been
driven here from the region above)) (to araxtov xai rapaXwOt:y t:vraN8a ttl=
av(1) Xtupa; an6L1i7,a a vov). If we take fl avo) X(6pa to refer to the intelligible,
divine world, as seems indicated, this would imply that the Indefinite Dyad
(Seth-"Typhon) originated in that realm, and that some sort of Fall ocurred
)1). Cfr. also Oid. ch. 14, p. 161), 311 ft: Hermann, where the same thing is said, the evocative
word xa' being used for the 'slumber' of the soul.
21. I have been criticised by reviewers (e. g. Harold T\RRAN-1 in Prudrntia X, 1978, p. 111) for
speaking so confidently about a logos doctrine in Plutarch. There is some justice in this
criticism, and I should be more cautious now, but I do not see how Plutarch's presentation of
)siris as the logos here can he dismissed as not 'part of Plutarch's regular system'. What is his
regular system?
1_2. I have not here dealt with the World Soul as presented in the Proc. An., which, as Werner
Di i stt has recently shown (Untersuchungen zur ,nittelplatonische and neuplatonische Seelenlehre,
\X icsbaden 1983, ch. II) is regarded by Plutarch as essentially non-rational, receiving reason
as something external to it. Plutarch is much influenced here I,c his interpretation of the
Polilhus ylvth.
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which would involve the World-Soul itself (Sophia), but it seems to imply
the ultimate origin of the principle antithetical to the One from the One
itself. However, perhaps one should not press this too far- ani-Xqi attt>vov
may only imply that F,vil is forever banished from the divine realm. In any
case, it does not directly bear on the situation of Isis herself, which seems
archetypally median and ambivalent.
V
But let us turn now from Plutarch to a brief and selective survey of the
underworld )> of Platonism, where female principles abound and prolifera-
te. First let us consider the Sophia of Valentinian Gnosticism, as the Valen-
tinian is that one among the Gnostic systems that gives the clearest
evidence of Platonist influence, at least in the form in which it is (indig-
nantly) relayed to us by the heresiologist I lippolytus."
Sophia is, of course, not the only female principle in Gnosticism , merely
the most interesting , in that it is her Fall and repentance that sets the who-
le cosmogony going. In Valentinus ' system, as presented by I lippolytus, we
begin with the supreme God , the Forefather , who procreates by himself
an initial pair of entities , one male ( Intellect - Nous ) and one female (' T'ruth
Aletheia ), and through them, then , a string of paired male and female en-
tities, called Aeons, the most junior of which, on the female side, is Sophia.
'T'hese aeons , twenty -eight (or thirty ) in all, together form the Pleroma. I
will let I lippolytus take up the tale of Sophia ' s misadventures (Ref VI
28,6-7):
«Now when the twelfth of the twelve ( sc. Aeons proceeding from
the Aeons Anthropos and licclesia), the youngest of all the twenty-
eight aeons , a female, Sophia by name, observed the quantity and po-
wer of the productive aeons, she hastened back into the depth of the
Father and perceived that all the other aeons, being begotten, were
procreating in pairs, but that the Father alone was procreating wit-
hout a partner. She wished to emulate the Father and to produce offs-
pring of herself alone, without a partner, in order that she might
achieve a work which would not be in any way inferior to that of the
I ather.>>
Sophia is thus the first feminist . tier ambition is not really evil, just radica-
lly misguided. ( In Irenaeus' account ( see n. 1 3 above ), her sin is simply de-
sire to know her Father , «to comprehend his greatness ; there is no ques-
23. Re/iaatron rf All heresies, VI 29, 2-36, 4.
24. In another version, that of Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. 1 1, 1-8, 6), who seems to he reporting the
system of Valentinus' follower Ptolemaeus, the Forefather is paired by a female principle,
his linnoia (Thought), an entity rather reminiscent of Philo's Sophia, on whom he engenders
Nous and Aletheia, and then a total of thirty aeons.
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Lion of emulation, since in that version he has a consort, Fnnoia). In any
case, the result of Sophia's presumption is a feeble abortion, the Demiur-
ge, laldahaoth, who then creates the physical world, and a host of demons
to rule it, and ultimately Man himself - although he and his henchmen
cannot get flan to work properly. Meanwhile Sophia, full of repentance,
sets about correcting her error. This involves inserting a spark of divine
pneuma into Man, and ultimately provoking the generation of Christ from
the whole Pleroma, as a saviour of the world, after the completion of
which salvation the world will dissolve.
Sophia's production of laldabaoth finds a curious parallel in Plutarch's De
!side, if we may turn our attention back there for a moment. At 373BC,
Plutarch gives an allegory of a composite Greco-Egyptian myth about the
birth of Apollo (I lorus) from Isis and Osiris, ((while these gods were still in
the womb of Rhea)). This means that ((before this world was made visible
and its rough material (kyle) was completely formed by the Logos, it was
tested by nature (tpi ma F)`ayxoµt`v>>v, whatever that really means), and
brought forth of itself the first creation imperfect> . This ((first creation)) is
termed the elder I lorus, and is said to have been Ix)rn in darkness, a cripple
-((a mere image and phantasm of the world that was to be)).
So Isis, it seems, produced a sort of foreshadowing of the cosmos on her
own, before being filled with logoi by Osiris." For Plutarch, this only indi-
cates her desire for Form and order, but it has a curious resemblance to
Valentinus' myth. A possible connexion (apart from direct dependence
-Valentinus is a generation or so younger than Plutarch) would be a
common dependence on Egyptian mythology. Valentinus was, after all, an
Egyptian, and other aspects of his system show the influence of Egyptian
religious conceptions.',
There is much more that could be said about Sophia in Gnosticism, and
about other female principles associated with her. In some versions, for
instance, she generates a lower projection of herself, Achamoth (from I le-
brew hokhviah, wisdom), who serves as an immanent organising principle
for the physical world (like Plotinus' concept of Physis later), while Sophia
remains above. But I want to turn, in the time remaining to us, to consider
one further female principle from the platonic Underworld, the formidable
I Tecate of the Chaldaean Oracles.
Th e Oracles date from the last decades of the Second Century,'- somewhat
later than Valentinus, and approximately contemporary with the Neopyt-
25. As is correctly noted by R. NI. JO ALS, in Classical Journal 19, 1924, pp. 565-6, who compares
the state of the Receptacle and its contents in Tim. 53.
26. For instance, the Forefather's production, without a partner, of Nous and Aletheia is reminis-
cent of Atum's production of Shu and On the question of a possible common source
for Plutarch's Isis and Valentinus' Sophia, see TOl'St l( It D i, fain onbekend gnostisch systeem in Plu-
tarchs De !.ride et Osiride, Louvain 1942.
27. Their author, a certain Julian, served with Marcus Aurelius on his campaign against the Quadi
in 173 A.D. as a sort of witchdoctor-in-residence, which provides a date for hisfloruit.
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hagorean Numenius, with which they have some points of contact. In Ir.
3,2' we hear of the «Power)) (dynamis) of the Father, a female principle more
intimately associated with the supreme god than even his Intellect -rather
like Philo's Sophia, or the Valentinian Ptolemaeus' Fnnoia, except that the-
re is no indication that power has any role in generating Intellect; it merely
(<remains with)) the Father, while the Intellect (<proceeds from)) him.
This dynamis, however, is distinct from and superior to I lecate,'° who
stands on the border between the intelligible and sensible worlds, acting
both as a barrier and as a link between them, very much in the role of
World Soul. In Fr. 6 she is presented as an intellectual <<diaphragm)) or
(<membrane)) (uns^wxwg ttS t`, tilt' vocpoc) between the two worlds, while in
Fr. 30 she is described as «fount of founts, a womb containing all things))
(7t11yi) rthv rtrjythv, n tpa 6uv£xouo to ltavta). She is regularly given the
epithet C(ooyovos, «lifegiving)) (Fr. 30; Proclus, In Tim. I 5,15; 11, 19-20; In
Parm. 1153,30).
Thus presented, Hecate seems to fill much the same role as Plutarch's Isis,
or Xenocrates' Dike (if we knew more about her). Some of her epithets,
such as metra, awomb)), connect her, like Isis, with the Receptacle of the
Timaeus, but she is also analogous to the World Soul, in that she perfoms
an active role in transmitting logoi to the physical world. Why the author of
the Oracles chose I lecate for this central mediating figure, rather than, say,
Athene or Isis, is not quite clear to me, but perhaps her role in magical ri-
tual was significant in this connexion, since the Oracles are, after all, a
handbook of theurgy, and Ilecate, as a chthonic deity, is easier to summon
up than Athene might be.
A complication in Hecate's status in that she is presented (in Fr. 50) as ha-
ving (<her centre established in the midst of the Fathers)) and Pscllus con-
firms this (Expos. 1152a), by saying that she is in the middle of the
osource-fathers)) (nr)yaiot itaiFpcc), flanked by the anal t:ltExctva (whom we
might term (<'I'ranscendental I))) above her, and the Bic i:ftsxctva (Transcen-
dental 11) below her. "' I lecate is thus the median element in a triad, fulfi-
lling the same role, that of dynamis, that the highest female principle per-
forms. It is possible, I suppose, that Psellus' account of Chaldaean theology
reflects Neoplatonic elaboration, and that in the Oracles themselves this
basic triad is all there ever was. Des Places is of this opinion, but I am
not so sure. 1':ither way, though, Hecate takes on some of the character of
the Hagion Pneuma, the Second Person of the Christian Trinity. It is with
that figure that we began, so it is suitable to end our survey at this point.
28. 1 use the Bude edition of F. DI s Pl.' -, Paris 1971.
29. Di^'s Pi Vci . tries to identify them ( Intro. p. 13), but Psellus' hxposition of Chaldaean Doctrine
(1 152a, p. 189 Des Places) makes it clear that they exist on different levels.
30. These curious titles seem to result from an interpretation of the Chaldaean deities Ad and
Adad (`Adad' being `Ad' doubled).
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VI
The entities surveyed in the second part of the paper demonstrate, I think,
in interesting ways, that the relationship set up by Plato in the Timaeus bet-
ween Demiurge, World Soul, and Receptacle is philosophically a most un-
comfortable one. I cannot believe that he intends us to take it literally, and
I am continually astonished at those scholars, some very distinguished,
who wish to take it so. The lesson to be derived, I think, from the way in
which the creative divine Intellect, the World Soul and the Dyad, or
Matter, are presented in the Old Academy and in Middle Platonism is that
those philosophers found it in all cases necessary to rearrange the relation-
ship. Fither the Demiurge becomes the supreme Intellect, repository of the
Forms, and the World Soul his active principle or logos, while Matter takes
on the features of an irrational World Soul, or the Demiurge is preserved
as a secondary, creator god, while the World Soul takes on the role of a
material principle, with or without a further material principle, either posi-
tively or just negatively evil, in the background.
At any rate, be that as it may, what I hope I have shown is that functional,
as opposed to purely grammatical femininity has an integral place in the
Platonic world-view -not the highest, certainly, but an honourable place
nonetheless. The female)) has been given such a negative connotation,
ever since the promulgation of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, that it
is right to remind ourselves of the considerable spread of roles which fema-
le principles in fact take on. Chercher la femme can be a rewarding activity
for the Platonic philosopher.
